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Abstract
Social media provide a platform for groups that
are not conventionally ostracized to claim marginality.
This study proposes a working definition for the
phenomenon of "co-opted marginality" within the
context of communication on social media. The
phenomenon is examined in the Singaporean context;
17 Singaporean citizens were interviewed about their
experiences with immigration online and offline. We
find that, within constrained legal, social, and
traditional media environments, social media provides
a platform for a dominant group facing challenges to
enact co- opted marginality.

1. Introduction
Media reports worldwide provide occurrences of
groups or individuals who claim marginality while
their actual position would not appear to substantiate
such claims. Some notable moments of co-opted
marginality include the trading tagline, “it’s okay to be
white.” This tagline first appeared on 4chan and made
a noticeable public appearance the day US White
supremacist personality Lauren Southern touched
down in Australia wearing a t-shirt displaying the
controversial meme [1]. The example elicits the notion
that despite their relative positions of high status,
individuals perceive themselves as being social
underdogs and marginalized.
This study examines theoretical avenues and
empirical evidence of co-opted marginality in the
Singaporean context, where numerous claims of coopted marginality have been emerging on social
media.
Singapore, a poster child of globalization, is hailed
as a model state for fostering a strong sense of
belonging among multicultural citizens of ethnically
diverse backgrounds [2]. The city-state has,
throughout the years, maintained a reliance on the
import of both low- and high-skilled foreign
workforce, aimed at achieving twin goals of economic
development and social welfare [3]. Acknowledged as
one of the wealthiest nations on earth, Singapore has
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pursued a distinctive development model that
prioritizes the creation of shared economic
opportunities for all its citizens [4]. The government
has invested heavily in citizens’ capabilities to
participate effectively in a productiveeconomy by
promoting education and offering economic
entitlements (public housing and social security
system via a mandatory savings scheme).
However, Singaporeans have recently denounced
their lack of equal opportunities vis-à-vis foreigners
[5]. In May 2014, 12 independent groups, including
Maruah, Singapore’s leading human rights group,
reported a worrying trend to “blame foreigners for
social ills” such as overcrowding or local
unemployment. These manifest through anonymous
posts online that mostly emphasize the frustrations of
feeling marginalized by “inequitable policies” [6].
Citizens protest that they are being discriminated
against and replaced by foreigners, calling themselves
“second class citizens” [2].

1.1 A country of immigrants
Since its heyday as a trading post in the 19th
century, Singapore has sustained an open-door policy
for immigrants. More recently, over the past two
decades, the city state has conducted one of the
world’s greatest experiment in mass immigration.
From 1999 to 2018, Singapore’s total population
grew over 40% to some 5.6 million, largely through
immigration, in comparison with global cities such as
London and New York, which grew at 25% and 13%,
respectively [7].
The authorities portray the influx of migrant labor
as an economic imperative [8]. In 2012, Prime
Minister Lee Kwan Yew declared “Like it or not,
unless we have more babies, we need to accept
immigrants” [9]. Other motivations are attributed to
the aspirations of the country’s “technocratic”
leadership within a narrative that pits Singapore as a
bridge between the East and the West [10]. The
“gateway” frame relies on attracting talented
individuals to promote the city’s economic growth.
The recruitment policies for the brightest, most
ambitious, commonly named “Foreign Talents”, has
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successfully contributed to the flourishing economy
of the city state whose GDP per capita is one of the
highest in the world, ahead of the USA and Japan
[11]. However, the policy has impacted the social
fabric of the nation.
The perceived rise and prominence of “Foreign
Talents” within the Singapore economy have
triggered anxieties and soul searching among bornand-bred Singaporeans who converge on social media
to vent their anger. The Facebook groups
“SGOpposition” (52k followers) or “Concerned
Citizens Band Together for a better Singapore”
abound in posts of personal stories lamenting how
foreigners have it all. A young disenchanted
Singaporean captured widespread attention (over
1000 likes) by recounting her experience at work: “I
just got a notification that a foreigner in my company
is the new GM of my department.. only HR has a local
manager. In my own team, I am the only
Singaporean… It’s not about working harder, longer,
or cheaper. It’s about not having protection from the
very own government who is supposed to protect our
livelihoods…They claim that it is those tech-specific
jobs that Singaporeans cannot do. Really? You mean
that all the young students in polytechnics and
universities cannot be trained to have tech skills for a
digital Singapore? Then what the hell are schools
for? To create subordinates for our foreign
managers?” [12].
Talks about the government’s need to protect
‘Singaporeans First’ amid the arrival of a growing
number of economic migrants is not new and have
been circulated online since the emblematic ‘cook and
share a pot of curry’ campaign in 2013 [13]. The
campaign was a response to a mediation agreement
imposed upon a Singaporean household to restrain
from cooking curry - the smell of which
inconvenienced their Chinese migrant neighbors. The
case was met with outrage by Singaporeans who felt
that cooking curry was a marker of national identity,
and 57,000 supporters gathered on Facebook to
encourage people to cook curry [14]. Ever since then,
community news sites on social media (Mothership,
Stomp, etc.) continue to feature occurrences of rows
involving typically self-entitled and well-off foreigners
that disrespect locals or local rules [15].
The government has reacted to the brewing
discontentment with the distribution of ‘perks’ to
citizens along with withdrawals of subsidies and
increases of taxes on noncitizens; measures were also
taken to dissuade the employment of foreigners by
regularly toughening up rules around workforce as
well as access to work visas [16]. 2016 marked the
first year in decades where the annual change in
foreigners at work in Singapore was reported as

negative by the Ministry of Manpower [17]. The
Republic of Singapore’s President Halimah Yacob
acknowledged concerns about foreigners affecting
Singaporean’s sense of identity and belonging,
declaring “as masters of our own land, Singaporeans
must have confidence in the rights and privileges of
citizenship” [18].
The objective of the paper is to identify the
negative rhetoric of Singaporeans towards foreigners
as belonging to the vocabulary of co-opted marginality
and understand, given Singapore’s unique context, the
role of social media as an enabler for such discourse.
We first propose and justify theoretically the
choice of the term marginality in the identification of
“co-opted marginality”.

2. Theoretical roots of co-opted
marginality
Marginality is traditionally conceptualized within
a framework of uneven distribution of power in
society. Complex factors causing poverty (resource
endowments, political systems, environmental
drivers) are associated with marginality. The standard
definition infers that social, political, economic, or
ecological systems affect and push individuals to the
margins of society, wherein they suffer restricted
access to resources, limited freedoms, and poverty
[19] However, most of all, marginalized groups are
excluded from fully engaging in the process of
communication and face structural impossibilities in
harnessing the power of media [20].
The concept of marginality has been critiqued as
elusive and lacking construct validity. Definitions of
marginality have been subject to debate and
misinterpretation [21], [22]. Park [23] first used the
term to describe the predicament of ambiguous
belonging, which characterizes the situation of
transitions such as migration or class changes.
Marginality simultaneously points to the mental
disorganization of a person fated to live at the
intersection of two worlds (cultural marginality) and
to the alienation arising out of the social position of
an aggrieved individual or group (structural
marginality) [24]. While conceptualizations of
marginality in the literature vary, these essentially
converge towards an analytical regime of
categorization to identify where the center and the
periphery of power hierarchies lie.

2.1 Marginality as a relative concept
As advocates of a pragmatic critique of society,
Boltanski and Thévenot maintain that actors’ sense of
reality is sustained by a grasp of their social
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environment [25]. People compare their situation
with that of others whose professional or personal
success has been greater than theirs, and their sense
of justice is shaped and justified by this comparative
capacity. This is also heavily influenced by various
instruments developed by the leaders (managers,
politicians, etc.). In this manner, understanding
people’s sense of justice and how they position
themselves in the social hierarchy requires one to
adopt a metacritical position that considers people’s
experience through the prisms of their social context
and the information they receive and consume.
Goffman argues that the sense of a collective
emerges via rituals of interaction; rituals, in this
instance, are mechanisms that develop a sense of
solidarity among individuals by generating common
meanings and common knowledge [26]. The meshing
of interaction ritual chains constitutes a sort of social
structure composed of groups whose memberships
depend on the symbols that have been created during
encounters [27], [28]. Society is thus composed of a
bounded “social world” whereby an individual unable
to take part in the discursive action of a group or a
social world cannot develop the necessary solidarity
and is left at the margins.
A pragmatic critique of domination and interaction
rituals suggests that perceptions of marginality do not
necessarily answer the functional and structured nature
of social hierarchy. It may be the result of complex
situated and relational subjectivities that are fashioned
by the interactional rituals people engage in, or the
social world in which they partake. It may also flow
from their sense of justice and justification. In this
manner, marginality can be the outcome of how one
perceives his or her identity and position relative to
others, and it can be applied to individuals or groups
that are not traditionally considered as evolving at the
margin. These considerations substantiate a link
between the concept of marginality and the claims of
dominant groups that we previously documented.
We posit a working definition of the phenomenon
of “co-opted marginality” as an identity claim
articulated by a dominant group that is based on the
shared but paradoxical interpretation of being
marginalized. For conceptual clarity, co- opted
marginality is not defined as a fantasy but rather as a
discourse of marginalization shared among members
of a dominant group that constitutes the basis of a
collective identity constructed via social media. Coopted marginality deviates from marginality in the
sense that it does not originate from social power
structures, but it is incited by rituals of interactions
and by narratives that specifically antagonize others
(i.e., immigrants, feminists, Muslims, foreigners,
elites, etc.).

2.2 Co-opted marginality, ignored and
condemned
Neuman [29] argues that communication research
is generally sympathetic towards minorities and groups
evolving on the margin of power. A review of
marginality in the context of the communication
literature suggests that the term has mostly been used
to characterize individuals placed on the receiving end
of prejudices or those that are excluded from taking
part in communication processes. The extent to which
institutions built around communication consolidate
and maintain political, economic, and cultural elites,
as well as exclude marginalized groups, is a
longstanding concern in the literature [30].
In traditional mass communication models,
people living at the periphery of the system are
susceptible to or dependent on the voice of
sympathetic cultural elites
(journalists,
film
directors, authors, politicians, etc.) to access the
public sphere [29]. Co-opted marginality reverses this
sympathetic tendency, as speaking of privilege is not
well accepted by the cultural elite. Co-opted
marginality claimants are ostracised as maladjusted
or as individuals driven by bigotry and xenophobia.
Indeed, discrimination against foreigners in
Singapore is explicitly condemned. The serving
Minister for Trade and Industry, Chan Chun Sing,
while asked to publish a breakdown of employment
data between foreigners and local Singaporeans
during the parliament session in January 2020,
dismissed the concern by claiming,
“The
insinuations seem to be that somehow the
Singaporeans are not benefiting…The ultimate
competition is not pitting the Singaporeans against
the PR [permanent resident], it is about the team
Singapore comprising Singaporeans, the PR and
even the foreign workforce … competing to give
Singaporeans the best chance possible” [31].
Similarly, commentators in the mainstream press
point to the presence of demeaning tweets and posts
about foreigners as “the perennial issue of
xenophobia in Singapore” and as a sign of passive,
reprehensible, and even dangerous attitudes of
citizens towards foreigners [32].

2.3 Emerging influences on social media
Singapore’s relationship with political pluralism is
complex, given the state’s cultural and multi- ethnic
background. The People Action Party (PAP),
Singaporean’s incumbent ruling party, in power since
the small state’s independence, is credited for
Singapore’s survival after the days of expulsion from
Malaysia in 1965, which is viewed as nothing more
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than a wonder. To this day, the PAP’s dominant
rhetoric of survival taps into the collective fears of
ordinary Singaporeans who have internalized the
need to contribute. This has led to a strong sense of
collective pride but also emphasized a materialistic
outlook that manifests into political apathy as
remunerative goals precede political ones [33]. The
PAP has developed a powerful influence on the
evolution of Singapore’s professional journalism with
the view to protect the nation- building project [34].
As articulated by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
(1971), “In such a situation, freedom of the press,
freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to
the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore,
and the primacy of purpose of an elected
government” [34].
Opportunities for opposition and mobilization in
the public sphere for antagonistic voices, however,
emerged with the Internet [35]. Citizens have been
exploring institutional paths for political influence and
have shaken a ‘managerial state’ that until then had
little fear of electoral backlash [36]. Social media “has
amplified divergent opinions and bypassed a tightly
controlled media that over the years has acted less like
a watchdog and more like a cheerleading squad for the
government and its ambitions” [37]. Since 2010,
communities and news web sites emerged, adopting at
times a critical stance towards government policies.
The State Times Review (STR), whose editor Alex
Tan is based in Australia, and the Online Citizen
(TOC) led this effort. The TOC was gazetted as a
political organization, but under the Political
Donations Act, the organization’s access to resources
remained restricted, unable to receive funds from
foreign contributors In February 2019, The STR was
blocked after publishing an article on the 1MDB state
fund scandal; TOC was investigated for criminal
defamation over the publication of the same story, and
de-gazetted. The turn of events prompted the Ministry
of Law to emphasize the need to introduce legislation
to stop fake news. Since April 2019, the Online
Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill, presented as the
first-ever effort garnered by a national government to
regulate social media, has invoke legal restrictions to
serve the public interest and protect society from
damage by online falsehoods created by “malicious
actors” [38]. A few writers and academics based in
Singapore and abroad have expressed concerns that
people may be deterred from commenting online [38].
Still, the importance of social media in the
Singaporean political landscape has endured and
strengthened. The General Election in 2020,
#GE2020, was dubbed by the local daily Straits Times
as a social media election [39]. Campaigning with the
context of COVID19 social distancing measures

meant candidates could mainly rally participants on
social media.
Given the nascent and influential role played by
social media in the Singaporean public sphere, it is
fitting to explore why and how the platform may
contribute and facilitate the spread of co-opted
marginality in Singapore.

3. Method
The author, a female of Caucasian origin and a
Singaporean PR, interviewed 17 citizens (11 males, 6
females). Participants were recruited on social media
from Reddit, Facebook community sites and Hardware
Zone (a community site hosted by Singapore Press
Holdings and famous for countercultural activities,
where mostly male users use a distinctive vocabulary
mixing the local dialect Singlish with memes).
Potential interviewees were identified from studying a
pool of comments that discussed immigration issues.
Participants were mainly Chinese Singaporean
citizens, except for one identified as Malay and four as
Others according to the CMIO (Chinese, Malay,
Indian and Others) classification. The interviews were
conducted in English and lasted from 45 minutes to
1.5 hours. Participants were informed that they would
be asked about their perception of immigration issues
in Singapore and of the discourse about immigration
on social media. They are referred to with
pseudonyms in this article.
The fact a non-Singaporean led interviews
requires caution in the analysis of the data. According
to Ganga and Scott, being insiders in the social
interview paradoxically makes awareness of different
worldviews and social divisions even more acute [40].
In this study, the researcher’s position of an outsider
may offer a nonpartisan channel for voicing authentic
and subjective views. Similarly, her position as a
foreigner may have dampened negative rhetoric about
foreigners among interviewees; while this position is
moderated by her status as permanent resident.
While the findings outlined below are not meant
to be representative of all social media users in
Singapore online public sphere, we aimed to capture
individuals’ identity constructions as co-opted
marginality claimants and gauge the role of social
media in making the identity salient. The qualitative
interviews allowed for critically exploring how
interviewees defined their social position vis-à-vis
foreigners and how their personal experience versus
the information they receive and consume on social
media influence their perceived positionality. This
method allows for assessing interviewees' subjective
understandings of their everyday experiences of
differentiation with foreigners - including the
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confrontations and the underlying prejudices - as well
as the influence of exposure or even active
participation on social media. We next present the
three key domains influenced by social media
(cultural and racialized social legacy; depreciated
public sphere; collective validation processes), which
affect how Singaporean citizens demarcate and
establish new collective identities.

4. Findings
4.1 Social media and the cultural legacy:
Racial harmony to co-opted marginality.
Singapore is referred to as a successful model of a
multicultural nation [41]. Singapore was built on
promises for a better future, housing since the 19th
century a diverse ethnic population hoping for a better
life. Singapore is the only nation outside Greater
China with a majority Chinese population,
descendants of earlier immigrants [42], and home to
significant Malay and Indian minorities. The diversity
of the ethnic population has been both an asset and a
challenge for development and has carefully been
administered by strict multiculturalist policies.
Singapore’s objective for a cohesive and harmonious
society relies on the embeddedness of cultural identity
in a non-threatening social climate [41], which is
supported by laws that restrict any expression that
would disrupt racial and religious harmony (Section
298 of the Penal Code). It is a liable offense to speak
words within hearing distance of a person that have
deliberate intention to wound that person’s religious or
racial feelings.
Journalists and scholars claim social media has
brought budding dissent among a younger generation
who feel slightly more inclined to talk openly about
the concept of racial tolerance online, a conversation
that is still uncomfortable to most Singaporeans [43].
Graphic and explicit racial tensions and fights
regularly emerge on social media. Yet, respondents
emphasize the powerful hold that racial harmony laws
still have. Brenda, a
28 year-old administrative assistant, confirmed “There
is a lot of tension between Malays and Chinese,
between Indians; but we don’t talk about it. No one
does”.
In contrast, social dissatisfaction about nonSingaporeans are openly and freely discussed. As Kyle
explained “You do not find people talking about race,
It’s more about foreigners.” The viewpoint was
vindicated when MP Raeesah Khan, a young Malay
member of the opposition Workers’ Party and recent
parliamentary elect, posted a tweet invoking racial
injustice about an incident involving foreigners who

were caught on camera while ignoring safe distancing
rules during the circuit breaker period: “Do you see
police officers here? Imagine if this was a
neighbourhood hawker centre. There would be
policemen swarming the area and enforcing the law
within minutes…. Why is the law different for these
people? Is it because they’re rich Chinese or white
people? Do you think expats will be treated with the
same disdain as migrant workers who broke the
law?”[44]. The MP made a full public apology after
receiving stern warning from the police force, she
nonetheless received extensive backing on social
media, she was the first political figure to make open
critical comments on race, although about foreigners
The idea of foreigners is strongly associated with
palpable anxiety over citizens’ abilities to succeed in
an increasingly competitive economy. Ching
summarised the pressure Singapore is under by
highlighting his disapproval of Singapore’s
materialistic and neo liberal pursuits as “just an
economic workshop. There is nothing beyond that, to
me. There is no significance. I’m not very happy
regarding how the country is progressing”. The
imperative for a flourishing economy has led to the
inflow of Foreign Talents (i.e., skilled foreigners) and
reinforced the common perception that Singaporeans
are not given the right opportunities to contribute to
their homeland. Faced with increased skilled
competition, Damian, an undergraduate student,
lamented that, “Singaporeans are not good enough.
That is what I think”. Citing the example of an Indian
national, Mr. Piyush Gupta, appointed as chairman of
Singaporean national bank DBS Derek, an
entrepreneur, found this appointment fair to ensure
the bank’s growth. However, he soon reflected that
“It’s a mixed bag. My general sentiment is that
authorities are very quick to give foreign talents the
benefit of the doubt and treat them better than
ourselves”. Citizens often compared themselves
unfavorably to foreign talents. TP, a hedge fund
manager, confided, “I might as well move overseas,
where there are better opportunities… A lot of these
foreigners, they have a degree from Harvard... But if I
graduate from NUS [a globally-ranked Singaporean
university], even if you are the best, you cannot really
compete.”
There is a sense of a double-squeeze from both
ends of the class structure. At the lower end of the
economy, Singaporeans systematically turn away
from menial or low-skill jobs, expecting migrants to
support the building of its world-class infrastructure.
TP acknowledged that “Look at maids and
construction workers. These are ok, because ..if you
need more houses, you need labor. You cannot expect
Singaporeans to do this labor-intensive job”. At the
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higher end of the employement scale, Singaporeans
feel side-lined. Derek claimed that “Singaporeans say
we want to practice meritocracy, maybe we even put
in the effort to, but unconsciously, we end up
privileging others”.
Participants discussed how the perceived change
in their social standing appeared unjust and
threatening. Brenda expressed the sense of the
majority being marginalized, stating “This is the only
place we can call home. If we’re being outcasted, or
we’re being kicked out, then where can we go? Even
though we are accepting of it, but we still feel a little
bit threatened. Like I guess, we are slowly becoming
the minorities”. Such realization is expressed as anger
on social media where Singaporeans vent frustrations.
Faizal however remarked that the acrimony does not
match the personal experience most people may have
with foreigners. When prompted to elaborate about
negative experiences, participants’ answers usually
corroborate with Faizal’s remark, “For those
[foreigners] whom I have had personal contact with, I
find them pleasant people. But unfortunately, online,
what we see… the bad behaviors, they are recorded
and posted online. Personally, I feel that… migrants
from China, India, they are generally nice,
hardworking and decent people. However, the
portrayal of people from that nationality is negative
online”.
Overall, the negative rhetoric online is not
necessarily seen as symptomatic of a Singaporean
brush with xenophobia but a reaction to anxieties
maintained by attitudes and aspirations that are
cultivated among Singaporeans. Brenna, a young
makeup artist, highighted the materialistic emphasis of
Singaporean society as a cause and dismissed
Singaporeans prejudicial leanings in justifying the
contentious content that spreads online. She believed
that “Singaporeans are bored; when people are
together, they do not discuss ideas. You can’t discuss
topics like global warming… Everything is just
superficial, materialistic things. That’s how our society
has basically been built on. You can’t really find
people with enough sustenance in them to carry a
conversation”.
In the end, presence on social media enables us to
identify fault lines within the - mostly young –
interviewees’ cultural legacy. They dare to envisage
different options and develop critical stances towards
long-held social norms such as racial tolerance. They
also acknowledge difficulties brought about by global
economic competition, which they attribute to
Singapore’s overbearing turn towards materialistic
objectives.

4.2.

An

undervalued

public

sphere:

Mistrusted mainstream media and vilified
social media
Asian values, multiculturalist constraints, and a
sophisticated legal system have subtly but decisively
regulated the public sphere in Singapore. Public
conversation is restricted by “O.B. markers” (out of
bound), whereby individuals tacitly know what is
taboo and what should not be discussed publicly,
namely race and politics [45]. XI, a government
employee, explained: “you have a freedom of
expression in Singapore, it’s just that, there are
certain lines you should not cross.” O.B. markers
learned at school, and through different socialization
processes support a cultivated “co-option and political
discipline” among the citizenry [46].
Participants are, however, wary about the news
they receive from the national media. For some, such
as Derek, traditional media organizations are credible
due to their close relationship with the authorities,
explaining that, “If you look at our media
organizations, Channel News Asia, TODAY, The
Straits Times. I think it’s wrong first to think that
they’re siding the government all the time. No, I don’t
think so. They’re doing their best to give a balanced
view…They don’t try to spin it. And they don’t just...
report what they hear. They usually match it with
what... they compare it with the Ministry to confirm
that this is accurate. That, to me, is credibility”.
Nonetheless, given the limited alternative
viewpoints available, the mainstream media is
regarded with suspicion. A number of participants
described mainstream media in Singapore as biased,
with Ching explaining, “I trust the BBC completely. I
would not second guess the news source…. But I’m
very sceptical towards Straits Times. Yes, because I
feel that it has always been a government
mouthpiece, in the sense that I feel that a lot of news
that I’ve heard about that are not being reported or
are not being reported transparently… I have never
had any confidence in what they do”.
Mainstream media seems irrelevant to younger
interviewees who grew up in a hyperconnected
world. Local news spreads fast online or fails to
cover sensitive topics, often leaving mainstream
media in the slipstream. According to Faizal,
“Generally, the stories on forums…you kind of know
that it’s real because, on other platforms, people are
talking about it as well. But these are usually not
reported on mainstream media”. To which Jonathan
adds, “mainstream media filter news to prevent any
misunderstandings… They want to just report what is
real and what is true, rather than what is
unconfirmed. But they usually end up publishing facts
that were already exposed on social media. There are
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actual cases where the journalists took the photo from
hardware zone and actually published it in the
papers”.
Suspicion is however not solely geared towards
mainstream media; interactions on social media do
not inspire much more trust. Participants viewed
negativity online as overwhelming and demeaning.
Faizal, a market researcher, shared experiences from
his job browsing forums on social media. He
explained that “it did affect my mentality, I felt more
jaded more quickly. I felt… the burden to read.
Because there was so much negativity. It just affects
you, personally. From time to time, I step away from
the computer and engage with real people”. Damian
remarked that such an attitude is even discernible on
online mainstream media like the Straits Times
comment section, remarking, “whenever they post
certain articles, then you go under the comments
section, they always like to scold each other. ..some
of them would actually create fake profiles ah. Just
for the sake of scolding or getting into quarrels”.
It is noteworthy to juxtapose participants' opinions
of social media with the rhetoric of the authorities.
Since its inception, the Internet has been depicted as a
suspicious medium. Back in 2009, Lee Kwan Yu
referred in a televised interview to a “vehicle for
subversion” [47]. Social media has only amplified the
divergence in opinions between the public and the
government.
Preserving the quality of the public sphere and
regulating public discourse on social media has
remained an important issue in national politics.
Singapore does not officially censor the Internet;
dissident political websites and foreign media sites are
freely accessible. However, restrictions are set in lieu
of heavy registration fees for the mandatory licensing
of online political sites, which give the Infocomm
Media Development Authority the power to demand
political sites to remove content that is deemed
dangerous to Singapore politics. The ‘Online
Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill’ of 2019 also
upholds criminal sanctions for the deliberate
dissemination of fake news that involves hefty fines
and jail sentences (up to 10 years) [38].
The critics of the deliberative value of social media
was matched with the respondent’s view of their
declining relevance and quality. Brenda’s reflection
emphasized issues linked to the quality of the public
space online, which she felt verged towards juicy
gossip and provocative content rather than serious
discussion. “Sometimes when you find an interesting
thread right, and the things that people say about the
people on the video. It’s just so outrageous. It’s just
crazy. Things that people say. I’m all for the drama. I
live for it. I basically live for it. Love it”.

Sites such as TOC that were initially launched to
offer alternative viewpoints on the Singaporean public
sphere are also suspected of exploitative
unconstructiveness. Xi acknowledged that he used to
read TOC, but he believed the quality has decreased:
“It’s like a cesspool. I couldn’t stand it anymore. So I
get out. I get out not because I don’t agree with what
I’m hearing, you know. It’s quality... It’s like… … I’m
not sure how to say this in English, in Chinese it’s
called trying to… dig bones from an egg… It’s like
trying to make a big issue out of something small”.
Generally, respondents maintained scepticism
towards social media. Brenda claimed, when she spent
time browsing and consuming news on her feeds of
local sites such as Crime Library Singapore, Kaypoh
Singapore, Motherships, to see “ugly fighting” and
toxicity spreading, remarking that, “they have no
message no purpose, it is all about trash… I’m not
being serious. I may have a lot of emojis, yeah. So… I
may not blatantly say out anything... but I didn’t trash
the government what. Ok. So you can basically
express negativity without saying anything, ah that’s
not really what I mean. ... I’m just being a keyboard
warrior here”. Breena added. “They just creep up on
you eventually, that kind of thing. Yes. So, that’s how I
feel about social media. They come and create some
troubles here and there”.
From a meta critical stance, these observations
made by citizens asserted and justified the rhetoric
held by authorities in Singapore about the risks and
perils of social media.

4.3. Social media as an enabler of collective
identity in a divided society?
Paradoxically, despite strong reservations towards
the deliberative value of discussions on social media,
participants conceded their influence when validating
their personal opinions. Although barely endorsing
active roles online, interviewees acknowledged the
collective value of the messages they received from
social media.
First, interviewees claimed to ‘fish’ for news on
online forums, read articles and posts, and share these
with friends but they remained reluctant to engage as
producers of content. Echoing the literature on
conformity and the fear of speaking out as outlined by
Noelle- Neuman’s “spiral of silence”
[48] interviewees were hesitant and rarely
commented or discussed seriours issues online. Derek
explained his attitude towards posting online, “Food
reviewers were getting in trouble at restaurants
because they gave a bad review. So if something as
minor as this, you get into trouble. There’s nothing
wrong with me sharing a piece of news. You can’t
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fault me for sharing a piece of news. But you can fault
me if I make a comment that’s unfair. You see. So
rather not comment”.
Beyond the pressure of social norms, online
content can lead to regulatory judgments. In 2016, a
young pregnant Japanese Australian woman received
a 10-month jail sentence for posting on a website
called “the real Singapore” articles deemed to incite
ethnic hatred [49]. Participants engaged in selfcensorship, too aware that participation in public
forums such as Facebook was not anonymous. The
fact, however, that some people did voice their
opinion in these circumstances appeared puzzling,
with Xi deeming it “interesting for me to see those
people on Facebook that are not anonymous.”
Brenda, while ignoring the influence of regulatory
policies and social norms, mentioned with a certain
indifference the opportunities to engage in debate and
struggles to justify non-active behavior online,
“Everyone is just out there to just have a little bit of
news. … I’m someone who doesn’t really comment a
lot. I’d just read and see what’s going on; then I’ll
share it with my friends. Yeah, but we won’t really say
much about it. Because we’re not really into politics
and stuff”.
Despite barely engaging in the social media space,
participants were tuned to the possibilities of
constructing a public consensus online and were
receptive to collective processes of information
validation. TP introduced the notion of a DTF Index,
discussed on Hardware Zone. Din Tai Fung is a
popular Cantonese restaurant that is known to gather
long queues at lunch or dinner time. A DTF queue is an
indicator; it signals with certainty the presence of
something happening for real (lunch or dinner time).
The concept transposed to news circulating online
helps assess the truthfulness of the statement made.
Applied to social media conversations, the DTF index
suggests that the aggregation of posts on a similar
story marks a consensus and therefore acts as an
indicator of truth. The DTF index institutes a large
volume of comments or likes as a signal to
authenticate the validity of a message circulating on
social media. Indeed, Johnathan confirmed that
repeating a story many times is a form of signaling,
which not only helps assessing whether it is true but
also influences perceptions of what is happening, “On
online forums, I see a lot of people complaining. … I
noticed this trend of people complaining about their
life, about their work, complaining about their salary
And what I can
say is that, if they keep complaining in a way that
foreigners actually impacted their lives, it actually
tells me that foreigners are here to snatch their jobs.
It’s just that I haven’t experienced it yet. But the fact

that they are complaining it for years, then I believe
that something is not right, I believe that’s the way...
why Singaporeans are angry.”
Knowledge exchanged on public forums online
seems to remove the sense of atomization and
passivity as interviewees felt able to have a true
picture of what others experience [50]. The knowledge
built on social media allows users to maintain an
illusion of universality and confirm that a specific
belief may be shared and coordinated among many.
Breena realized that the construction of such
consensus online may happen at the expense of other
valid narratives that individuals ignore as they are
caught up in collective validation processes, “I say this
is my country and my home because Singapore is
really very secure. Sometimes we just don’t really
care. So we always talk trash, but we don’t really see
what’s going on. Yeah. So there is a lot of things that
the government gives Singaporeans. Or Singaporeans
give Singaporeans. But you forget about it online. We
don’t see it. Or we just ignore it.”

5. Discussion
This study has proposed theoretical elements and
analyzed empirically co-opted marginality in the
Singaporean context. We argue that co-opted
marginality could be interpreted as a means to
camouflage morally and normatively illegitimate
contestation and make it acceptable. Over the years,
researchers of racism online have pointed to
strategies used by actors to recruit adherents by
increasingly using sophisticated and unassuming
discourse [51]. Traditionally explicit and blatant use
of racism has become more subtle with prejudices
getting trivialized, denigrated, and even denied [52].
Younger generations notably are more restrained in
the use of hateful language and resort to almost
undetectable micro-aggressions [53]. Within the
citizen immigrant frame, co-opted marginality may
serve as a communicative strategy to making
prejudice-loaded and racist claims more palatable by
flipping the discourse (we are not oppressors / we are
victimized, or we are not anti-foreigner/ we are
suffering).
On the other hand, co-opted marginality claimants
are themselves denied fair hearing of their grievances.
The cultural elite and authorities in Singapore have
leaned towards associating the discourse with
xenophobia and prejudicial anti- foreigner discourse,
insinuating bigotry and reprehensible behavior. While
the notion of marginality attracts sympathetic
considerations, co- opted marginality, reactions to the
feeling of relatively higher status individuals (white,
citizens) of being pushed aside are viewed as
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dubious, suspicious, and non-receivable.
Despite a growing awareness of co-opted
marginality online, the phenomenon has scarcely
been examined. Most theories on nationalistic and
nativist tendencies refer to the idea of threat coming
from other groups. Co-opted marginality may point to
a more nuanced collective identity construction
process that is not based on well-established and
stereotyped ideas about who and what foreigners
entail but on shared perceptions of common personal
experiences. Such experiences can be easily laid bare
on a participative and reciprocal platform such as
social media. Such a perspective suggests that social
media, beyond encouraging self-censorship and
spirals of silence, may shape signaling mechanisms
and enable users to communicate more easily, resolve
ambiguity, dissonance and coordinate private with
public selves [54].
From a theoretical perspective, co-opted
marginality focuses attention on the relativity of the
notion of self-categorization, and calls for
interrogating how collective identities based on group
socio-psychological dependance emerge on social
media. According to social identity theory,
individuals form their identity by classifying or
naming themselves in relation to other groups or
social categories [54]. The co-opting and
appropriation of marginality by social categories that
normally do not evolve on the margins are perplexing
as at first this seems to lack legitimacy and second,
this does not fit within the established premises of
social identity theory. Reasons why high-status groups
support the co-opted marginality discourse and
challenge their group’s consensus of their group’s
dominance need to be further explored. We point to
Foucauldian (1997) perspectives on discourse and
power, which suggest that the media are not a
transparent window into reality. They are infused
with political discourses that define meanings, which,
in turn, define ways of thinking and acting [55].
According to Foucault, individuals are constructed
and normalized by the regimes of power under which
they live: the interweaving of discourse and power
produces a regime of relative truths that gets
disseminated by the people in charge. The co-opting of
marginalized identities makes the notion of status a
site of contestation and confusion, and may be part of
an emancipatory process that uses the participatory
mechanism of social media to challenge rules and
norms established by the regime of power.
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